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Abstract: Music is often described in anthropomorphic terms. This paper suggests 
that if we think about music in certain ways we could think of it as conscious. 
Motional characteristics give music the impression of being alive, but musical 
motion is conventionally taken as metaphorical. The first part of this paper argues 
that metaphor may not be the exclusive means of understanding musical motion – 
there could also be literal ways. Discussing kinds of consciousness, particularly 
“access consciousness” (Block 1995), the second part proposes ways in which music 
could (hypothetically) be conscious. The conclusion states that a greater 
understanding of the interactions of “phenomenal consciousness” and “access 
consciousness” is important in conceptualizing non-human consciousnesses, such as 
music might be conceived to be. 
Keywords: Agency; Animacy; Anthropomorphism; Consciousness; Musical Authorship; 
Music’s Personhood 
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Introduction 
 Since its beginnings the precise nature of music has confounded human 
thought. In a sense, music is not just the soundtrack to our lives, but an “other” who 
speaks “to” as well as “alongside” us (cf. Park 2013). We often anthropomorphize 
music as an independently functioning being, but stop short of thinking of music as 
actually conscious. Consciousness is mysterious – it is even a mystery what motivates 
us to ascribe consciousness to anything outside ourselves (Arico, Fiala, Goldberg & 
Nichols, 2011). Lloyd (2011, 2013), interestingly, has shown that the dynamic-
temporal systems of brain consciousness, as revealed by fMRI, are more nearly 
related to musical than to linguistic structures. If, as such studies argue, music 
promisingly assists in the characterization of the neurophenomenological 
environment and its processes, there is the possibility of thinking the other way 
around, that the nature of music has an affinity with consciousness. The object of this 
paper is to argue that if we think about music in certain ways we could conceive it as 
conscious. In doing this the paper hypothesizes what actual musical consciousness 
would look like. 
 Why would considering music as conscious be worthwhile? It would enable 
us to make sense (as we ought to do) of our anthropomorphic conceptions of music. 
And it would offer a more complete picture of how we habitually think and feel 
about it, for example concerning its wordless power. We would also enhance how 
we experience music. Music performance pedagogy, for example, would benefit 
from considering musical notes and works as having consciousness: we could bring 
music “to life” in performance even more by conceiving that life in a literal sense. 
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Creators of musical works – such as composers and improvisers – could understand 
more deeply and interpretively how pitches, rhythms and other musical elements 
behave in a work, by considering their consciousness (some analysts already do this 
to an extent). As musical practitioners, humans have engaged with music indirectly 
(especially in utilizing metaphor to capture its meaning). Considering music as 
conscious could afford a more direct engagement with it and enable more to be 
discovered about both it and us. 
 The claim that we could conceive music as conscious (thinking about it in 
certain ways) has two elements. The first is that our ordinary experience of music is 
so intimate and personal that in order to justify it we need a concept of music as 
conscious, an as-if way of speaking about musical consciousness. The second, more 
tentative element is that music could of its nature be conscious. This would mean 
connecting music and consciousness ontologically. The claim overall is discussed 
from the perspective of philosophy, with some support from the disciplines of 
psychology and neuroscience. Taking consciousness as something humanly 
experienced that we are still trying to understand, the issue of conceiving music as 
conscious is acute because we are considering what it would be like to be something 
that is obviously unlike us. For here we must want to know not what it would be 
like for us to be the thing in question but what it would be like for the thing to be 
itself. Consciousness may exist in infinite, unimaginable ways, that is, there may be 
forms of its existence whose precise nature is (currently) beyond the grasp of our 
reason (Nagel 1974). 
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 How could music be conceived as conscious? One of its most important 
characteristics is motion, which in animate entities indicates the presence of life. 
However, the concept of motion in music as occasioning its consciousness raises 
questions. This is because musical motion is habitually taken as metaphorical, 
therefore to use music’s motional properties to assert its consciousness is to use 
properties that are constructed by the listener’s perceptual system, not by the music 
itself. Part 1 of this two-part paper, therefore, addresses the important issue of 
musical motion as being metaphorical. Part 2 aims to theorize and stimulate debate 
around what attributing actual consciousness to music would look like, and 
assembles brief theses with hypothesized scenarios in which music is an active, even 
sentient player able to offer first-person testimony of its own vitality – a 
consciousness co-equal to biological consciousness. 
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Part 1: Musical motion – metaphorical or literal? 
  Animacy, agency and metaphor 
 A musical texture is the copresence of sounds arranged according to some or 
all of their physical properties (such as frequency, amplitude, intensity, spectrum, 
duration, envelope, modulation, and reverberation). Musical motion is generally 
seen as resulting from cooperation between elements from perceptual properties – 
such as pitch, harmony, rhythm, and dynamics – arising from these physical 
properties, which, while nonmotional in themselves, can, when manipulated by the 
composer, create a lifelike texture (cf. Miller 1983, pp. 59-60). This underlies 
contemporary descriptions in music theory of elements of music as agents or actors 
that produce particular effects (Tarasti 1991; Hatten 2015; Thumpston 2015). Motion 
can occur in respect of both inanimate and animate entities. An apple has motion 
when it falls from a tree, but the motion of animate entities is generally self-
movement presupposing agency. In the case of putative musical consciousness, it is 
the latter kind of motion that is of most interest. However, properties, such as ascent 
or descent of pitch, which appear to induce a sense of musical motion, seem to be 
metaphorical constructs by composers, performers and listeners. As such, they are 
not therefore part of an autonomous entity and cannot be used to indicate the 
consciousness of music. 
 
 Metaphorical and literal musical motion 
   Metaphorical musical motion 
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 Nonmotional properties, such as melody, harmony, rhythm and dynamics, 
and, in some musical performances, space (spatial transfer of sound, as in antiphonal 
singing), while nonmetaphoric, are perceived, in a metaphorical way, as motional 
properties. A change of pitch, for example, is said to cause a change of direction in 
the music and thus to occasion the perception of motion. Eitan and Granot (2006) 
found that changes in most nonmotional properties of a given segment of music 
generate changes in how listeners associate that segment with imagined human 
movement when invited to do so. For example, when the pitch contour of a melody 
was altered, listeners perceived that the imaginary human figure moved in fresh 
spatial directions and with a different speed and energy. The argument frequently 
made from such findings is that changes in the physical characteristics of the 
nonmotional property of pitch contour (its up- or down-ness, its smooth- or 
jaggedness, its evenness or disjunction) undergo metaphorical transfer to the domain 
of the specification of how the human body moves in space and time. When the 
transfer is done, the original nonmotional properties become re-presented as 
motional properties. These new motional properties, it is argued, have been 
constructed by the listener from imagination having metaphor at its root. 
 Such findings and their metaphorical explanations are interesting and 
forceful. The framework of metaphorical cognition (the mind reasoning via the 
concept of metaphor) is therefore not to be ignored. Cognitive, or conceptual, 
metaphor theory (CMT), for example, argues that “most of our ordinary conceptual 
system is metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, p. 4). Thus lying behind 
much ordinary language is a governing conceptual metaphor acting as master 
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narrative. For example, the sentence “his criticisms were right on target” is ordinary 
language instantiating the conceptual metaphor argument is war. This and other 
conceptual metaphors, according to CMT, are inherent in our cognition.1  
 Proponents of CMT in music theory and philosophy accept that actual motion 
in music is a belief on the part of the listener that is validated only by “the metaphoric 
logic that maps actual spatial relations onto the relations of musical events” (Cox 
1999, p. 204). Assisted by Cox’s work, Johnson and Larson (2003) argue for specific 
metaphors of musical motion, notably the Moving Music metaphor, in which “a 
musical event is conceptualized as an object that moves past the stationary hearer 
from front to back” (p. 69). Johnson and Larson briefly note (p. 70) that utilizing this 
metaphor gives the impression that there is some object in music that actually moves 
whereas (because the frame is metaphorical) this is in fact not the case. In CMT to 
ask what in music actually moves misplaces the whole issue – the best that can be 
said is that our experience of music shares something with our experience of seeing 
objects move in physical space. The identified metaphors of musical motion 
(especially the Moving Music metaphor) institute systems of mappings that, though 
“systematic” (p. 69), are complex in such a way as not to be able (or want to) specify 
the origins of musical motion. It appears that in such systems it is not reasonable to 
think of something as actually moving in music. This is because in order 
conceptually to access the realm of musical motion in the first place it is necessary to 
utilize cognitive metaphorical mappings, and the nature of metaphor precludes 
actual motion being applied to music, which is conceived ultimately as inorganic. In 
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other words, our perception of motion in music, though vivid, remains only a 
perception that is derived simply from metaphor as the basis for cognition. 
  
   Literal musical motion 
 How, nonetheless, could we think of the motional properties of music as 
nonmetaphoric? A detailed exploration of philosophical ways of supporting this 
idea is outside the scope of this paper. One answer to be mentioned here is that, 
while the CMT account put forward especially by Cox (1999), and Johnson and 
Larson (2003) discusses musical motion impressively and in detail, there is still the 
query that it is far from clear that “metaphor”, in the locution “metaphorical musical 
motion”, has a uniform meaning. A basic precept of the cognitive approach to 
metaphor is that it is no longer viable to speak of metaphor as simply a rhetorical 
device – it is instead deeply involved in actual cognition (Kassler 1991). What this 
appears to have done, however, is remove the rhetorical function from metaphor 
entirely and replace it with an exclusive concept of process linear mapping from 
source to target domains. The mappings that result constitute the specific cognitive 
content of the metaphor that enables conceptualization but not direct apprehension 
of the object of inquiry (in this case, musical motion). However, in a much-discussed 
paper Davidson (1978) famously and pertinently argues (in contradistinction to the 
claims of Lakoff and Johnson, 2003) that, however metaphors work, they do not do 
so by virtue of having a “special cognitive content”. Though Davidson does not deny 
that a metaphor has a point that can be explained using further words, he does deny 
that either metaphor or metaphor-maker says anything beyond the literal meaning 
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of the words comprising the metaphor.2 There are various details in Davidson’s 
controversial paper that enable a reading of the case of musical motion such as the 
following: Musical motion is a metaphor that means music moves. We have to make 
a metaphor about the action of music but even when we do so we end up saying that 
music moves. There is no other, metaphorical sense of musical motion apart from the 
literal. To say, metaphorically, that music moves is not to say anything about music 
beyond its moving. It is, of course, to say that there is a point to saying that music 
moves, and that this point can be brought out by using further words. The point in 
saying that music moves is what these words do. To say that music moves is not to 
give the movement of music a special meaning, it is to say that there is an action 
associable with music moving. 
 What Davidson’s argument in particular suggests is that the meaning of 
“metaphor” as it occurs in the expressions “metaphorical musical motion” or 
“metaphorical cognition of musical motion” is subject to interpretation. While it may 
be possible to argue that metaphor is deeply involved in cognition, arguing in this 
way does not necessarily mean that uncertainties surrounding the meaning and 
function of metaphor are removed. It is thus doubtful whether an account of the 
meaning of “metaphor” in these expressions can just be separated from rhetorical 
analyses of metaphor such as Davidson’s. If this meaning is wider than in the 
source-domain mapping-oriented CMT account, the access it is thought metaphor 
offers to cognitive realms otherwise considered inaccessible (such as musical motion) 
must be qualified by acknowledging the connection of metaphor with literality. We 
can, therefore, at least think about literalist accounts of musical motion.
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Part 2: Into musical consciousness 
 Empirical evidence  
How could we evidence the consciousness of music? In reconceptualizing 
what it is like to be something that is unlike us, we would have to envisage the 
nature and process of evidencing for such a reconceptualization. If music were 
conscious, its consciousness would appear not to be reportable and hence it would 
obviously be difficult to get empirical evidence. Baars (1994) argues that general 
empirical principles for discerning consciousness can be deduced from categories of 
contrasting pairs of conscious and unconscious experiences. In each pair, two things 
are compared that are very similar except that one is conscious and one is not, and 
this enables the isolation of features associable with consciousness. For example, in 
spontaneous problem-solving the stage of definition of the problem belongs to 
conscious experience, the intermediate processes that go towards solving it are 
unconscious, and the “eureka” moment when the solution to the problem appears to 
us is once again conscious. By considering these experiences as ranged on the two 
extremes of the consciousness spectrum (“conscious” or “unconscious”), relevant 
empirical data emerge to suggest whether something is conscious. It might 
(hypothetically) be possible to utilize Baars’s empirical approach of contrastive 
analysis to evidence the consciousness of music by ranging music along the 
consciousness spectrum with other phenomena. On the other hand, Gamez (2014) 
asserts that unreportable consciousness would undermine contrastive analysis. The 
difficulty might be avoided by postulating that music’s active and continuous 
juxtaposition (rather than discrete eventuation) of sounds and silences would 
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constitute a report.  In the case of biological consciousness the act of reporting 
occasions a fluctuation in consciousness (Frith, Perry & Lumer, 1999). Whether a 
conscious music would do this would be a matter for further exploration and 
experimentation (if there was empirical progress). 
 
 What kind of consciousness?  
 Fundamental to consciousness is the awareness of something. Awareness is, 
however, not limited to the level of the immediate access provided in primary forms 
of experiencing. Mandik (2010) expounds a “second-order” awareness called control 
consciousness, the awareness or experience of seeming in control of one’s actions. 
Also, Dretske (2003) notes the problem of how we are aware that we are aware of 
things (this is not the same as the question of how we are aware of what we are 
aware of). Objects and properties do not themselves obviously carry information 
about this second-order awareness. Dretske, while not offering a definitive answer, 
thinks that in this case some kind of introspection occurs. What is significant about 
this problem is that it is relevant wherever consciousness is attributed. 
 A prominent category of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness (P-
consciousness) stems from what-it-is-like-ness (Nagel 1974). A neurophysiological 
definition of P-consciousness is the presence of correlated neural activity in the 
sensory cortex of between 35 and 75 Hz (Crick & Koch 1990). In the important 
account by Block (1990, 1995) a P-conscious state is one that has experiential 
properties (in classical sense datum theory, properties defining our experiences of 
perceptual objects having shared characteristics – the redness of red objects, for 
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instance [cf. Shoemaker 1994, p. 22]), the total of which make up what it is like to 
have that state. P-conscious states can involve perception, sensation, feeling, 
thought, desire and emotion.3 For example, we have P-conscious states when we 
perceive through seeing, tasting, or smelling, and when we sense through having 
pain. A non-phenomenally conscious state Block (1995) calls access consciousness (A-
consciousness). An A-conscious state is one that is “poised” for use in reasoning, 
action and speech. The states typical of A-consciousness are “propositional-attitude” 
states, that is, states with representational content (content predicated of an external 
object) expressed by “that” clauses, for example the thought that p.4 A further idea of 
P-consciousness and A-consciousness is obtained by considering both how they can 
occur separately from each other and how they can interact. We can be P-conscious 
of a pneumatic drill by being aware of and experiencing its sound and vibration for 
some time before becoming A-conscious that it is in fact a pneumatic drill (P-
consciousness without A-consciousness). In the reverse case, someone with 
blindsight (the ability of a patient, who is blind due to lesions in her primary visual 
cortex, to react to visual stimuli that she does not consciously see) who “guesses” 
that there is one letter in her visual field rather than another is A-conscious of the 
guessed letter without any P-consciousness (A-consciousness without P-
consciousness). The content of a P-conscious state (P-conscious content) is 
phenomenal (capable of being known experimentally or observationally) while the 
content of an A-conscious state (A-conscious content) is representational (predicated 
of an object in the external world). As Block puts it, “the content of an experience can 
be both P-conscious and A-conscious, the former in virtue of its phenomenal feel and 
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the latter in virtue of its representational properties” (1995, p. 232). Two further 
principal concepts of consciousness accruing from P-consciousness and A-
consciousness are self-consciousness and monitoring consciousness. Self-consciousness is 
possessing a self-concept and being able to use it in thinking about oneself. 
Monitoring consciousness internally perceives (in a way similar to P-consciousness) 
or scans the conscious states one is in. At a higher level it can be a conscious state that 
includes the thought that one is in that state. 
 
 Theses 
 The following exploratory theses offer scenarios of musical consciousness, 
relying on the idea that holding thoughts or attitudes indicates consciousness. The 
theses are necessarily speculative and fragmentary, because of the inherent 
difficulties in the subject matter of this paper, but they are intended to present 
intuitive reasoning that will enable clearer discussion of this subject matter. The 
concept of reflexivization – that music could take reflexive attitudes, towards itself – is 
proposed. Some previously mentioned concepts of consciousness which bear on 
reflexivization are: control consciousness, access consciousness, self-consciousness and, to 
an extent, monitoring consciousness. These are mostly states concerned with the 
organism’s self-regulation of its mental environment and awareness. In trying to 
understand what it would be like for music to take an attitude, these concepts are 
relevant, because, in indicating what it is like to be us, they point towards an 
analogous conception of what it is like for music to be music and even towards a 
grasp of the unimaginable state of music being itself. 
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   Thesis 1 – Fictionalist intentionalism and reflexivization 
 The power of music means we enter into a personal relationship with it that is 
not just a sociocultural construction (cf. Parncutt & Kessler, 2007) but one dependent 
on understanding music really as personal and having personal functions (cf. Watt & 
Ash, 1998). In order to consider music’s personhood in terms of a conscious capacity 
to think and to insinuate its own thoughtfulness, what is important is whether the 
attribution of some kinds of attitudes to music would be true or false. Truly 
attributed, these attitudes could be reflexivizations, or introspective activities, of 
music turning towards its own nature. Livingston (2005, p. 165) gives a markedly 
sceptical account of interpretation that “frames ideas about the attitudes expressed 
in the work [of art], but does so without asking whether those attitudes were in fact 
intentionally made manifest by anyone”, which he terms “fictionalist 
intentionalism”. In fictionalist intentionalism, there is an origin, of putative attitudes 
or intentions in the work, which seems real or is even probable, but is not the agent 
who created the work (p. 140). But, notwithstanding scepticism, it is precisely this 
that has significant potential for understanding music’s meaning, and the 
introspective activity here termed reflexivization is an active offshoot of considering 
music as fictionally intentional. 
 
   Thesis 2 – Music as personality: beyond implication  
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 Despite themselves, writers such as Cone (1974) and Maus (1991) flirt with the 
fascination of what it would mean to describe music anthropomorphically. Cone 
reduces the idea of personifying music to a theory based on implication (music as an 
implied person), but uses powerful language to do so. He says (1974, p. 3) that “the 
expressive power of every art depends on the communication of a certain kind of 
experience, and…each art projects the illusion of the existence of a personal subject 
through whose consciousness that experience is made known to the rest of us.” For 
Cone, the idea of impersonation is key to the reality of music – music depends on 
implied personation. Cone identifies the “speaking voice” of music as a kind of 
consciousness called the implicit musical persona, which he says “is by no means 
identical with the composer; it is a projection of his or her musical intelligence, 
constituting the mind, so to speak, of the composition in question” (p. 57). This is 
fascinating territory: what would it mean for something to “constitute the mind” of a 
composition? What would that something have to be like? Cone postulates “a 
spontaneity that seems to inhere…in [the activity of] the music itself. The music will 
then appear to live its own life, so to speak – to compose or think through itself” (p. 
63). How might this “spontaneity” be characterized? What might music’s ability to 
“think through itself” consist of? How can music “live its own life”? Music has life, 
certainly, it is frequently acknowledged, but how does it live that life? Engaging with 
questions such as these provides new suggestions that the referential field of music 
can be broadened from the familiar categories of real-world sound analogues and 
human emotions to thought itself. As Cone puts it, in his analysis of Berlioz’s second 
programme for the Symphonie Fantastique, music’s “field is the inner life of the 
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experiencing subject”, the content of which is “no less than a symbol of musical 
content itself” (p. 86). 
 
   Thesis 3 – Agency and authorship  
 Authorship underlies how a conscious music could act. In a mysterious-
sounding passage from his precise definition of personhood, Hobbes (1996, p. 108) 
says: “But things inanimate, cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their 
actors: yet the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them 
by those that are owners, or governors of those things. And, therefore, such things 
cannot be personated, before there be some state of civil government”. 
Notwithstanding Hobbes’s denial of authorship to “things inanimate”, music is 
often deemed as being an actor or composed of actors. In this we usually consider that 
music behaves as we do by performing, for example, feats of movement (such as 
acceleration and deceleration) and direction (such as up and down), considering 
what it is like for music to be us rather than be itself. Supposing music does have 
reflexive attitudes that self-comment on its own nature, do they bear an authorial 
relationship to music, in that the attitudes author music by “owning” it? We may often 
think of the relationship the other way around, that music is itself authorial by virtue 
of its supreme pervasiveness, through which it almost “owns” everything it touches 
(this fits with Romantic or formalist principles that there is no room for anything 
other than music itself). If we intuit that music as a phenomenon has intention we 
could attribute a layer of consciousness to it. Thus we could adapt Hobbes’s 
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qualification that “actors” (that is, music) may “procure the maintenance [asserted 
truth]” of “things inanimate” (even if, in Hobbes’s terms, the latter, in the shape of 
attitudes, cannot be authors). In other words, inanimate things, or their concepts, can 
be upheld by actors who receive authority to do so from whoever (or whatever) 
owns these things. Could music be “authored” by extramusical attitudes that are 
reflexivizations on its own self, such that it even “embodies” these attitudes? Music 
is instead habitually read in such a way that its author is absent (cf. Barthes 1968). 
 
   Thesis 4 – The significance of reflexivization 
 To think metaphorically about music is to think that because meaning in 
music can reside only in unintelligible signs (musical notes) it is, in order that it can 
be talked about, carried across to another domain. Somehow, purely musical meaning 
exists in the notes, but, because it cannot be talked about in terms of meaning as such, 
it is redundant. So it must be metaphorical. But if music were conscious, it could tell 
itself things. It could self-comment, to itself. Its self-commentary would be reflexive 
and recursive, coming from its consciousness. 
 We disdain music due to our drawing back, our refusal to consider the union 
of its nature – fragmented, and eked out by us in figural descriptions – into self-
awareness. But, if conscious (or even in our ordinary, or anthropomorphic, ways of 
speaking about it), music itself disdains our disdaining of it. This kind of process 
evokes what Bakhtin defines as the “second stage of objectification”: “[I]t is also 
possible to reflect our attitude towards ourselves as objects…In this case, our own 
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discourse becomes an object and acquires…its own…voice. …this voice no longer 
casts (from itself) a shadow, for it expresses pure relationship” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 110). 
The shadow that this “pure relationship” does not cast is “a figural, substantive 
shadow”. Of course, with music we never seem able to escape metaphor completely, 
but we can go behind musical metaphors, that is, we can circumvent them (such as in 
thinking how the motional properties of music could be thought of as 
nonmetaphoric). In this a concept of musical consciousness helps us. Flickering 
somewhere between metaphor and directness, music’s consciousness is, as Cone 
argues, implied – but, if we think about music in certain ways, it could be (as it were) 
literal. 
 
 Conclusion 
 This paper has argued (Part 1) that we could think of musical motion as literal 
(and possibly motivated by some conscious agency). Having proposed this idea, it is 
then argued how at least some theories of biological consciousness (outlined in Part 
2) are applicable to how music could be self-aware and active if it were conscious. 
These are theories describing conscious states derived from self-regulation. To think 
about how music could regulate itself, we need to think about reconceptualizing the 
notion of experience. Rosenberg (2004) defends the possibility of non-cognitive 
experience, which is called panexperentialism, by arguing that experience has an 
open-ended character consisting of a sliding scale from cognitive to noncognitive 
experiencing. Panexperientialism accepts that certain systems, such as people, 
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mammals, fish, and birds, are conscious, but starts also to accept the consciousness 
of entities like insects and artificial systems, while recognizing that the consciousness 
of the latter is fuzzier. The sliding scale appears to taper off when it becomes 
incoherent to speak of entities whose cognitive capabilities are below a certain level 
as having experience, but it could just as well be that such entities, as experiential, do 
have coherence. Non-cognitive experience is qualitative – that is, presents distinct 
feelings and information about things – in ways very alien to us. It is analogous to 
the non-cognitive system in question as experience is to the human mind. Because 
there is no cognition associated with these experiences, the states they constitute are 
protoconscious. Kind (2006) and Nagasawa (2006) object that it is unclear how, 
without factoring in consciousness, we can make sense of the notion that there is a 
subject of experience. For experiences are not free floating, they must have subjects. 
But, as summarized in the “hard problem of consciousness” (Chalmers 1995, pp. 202-
203), merely explaining the performance of cognitive and behavioural functions and 
processes accompanying experience does not explain why this performance results 
in experience. We cannot, therefore, know whether it follows from the consciousness 
allegedly resulting from such functions and processes that experience necessarily has 
a subject. If experience does not have to have a subject, this leaves the door open to 
other kinds of awareness that may be nonsubjective.  
 Music is conventionally thought of as being simply a series of sound events. 
As such it is not a continuant entity having subjective experience (defined as 
knowledge accumulating to a subject through cognition). However, our instinct is 
that music is somewhat more than this. It is intimately personal to us, and our 
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engagement with it is as if with a personal consciousness. How therefore could 
music be thought of as a self-regulating awareness? This paper proposes that A-
consciousness, which typically expresses propositional thought without there 
necessarily being phenomenal experience, could be thought of as applicable to 
music, as a form of consciousness that can include self-regulation. In the case of 
music, A-consciousness might be thought of as a form of consciousness that is 
available when it is not clear that there is a subject of experience. Fictionalist 
intentionalism, as explained by Livingston (2005) (the attitudes thought to be present 
in a work of art are not intentionally made manifest by anyone), is important here. 
Thinking of music as A-conscious, it could in the case of music be argued that 
propositional thought (the thought that p), which is characteristic of A-
consciousness, does not necessarily have a subject in the standard sense (a subject 
that cognizes and has experience). An important way of looking at the thought that p 
is that it could be said to stand independently of a thinking subject because it 
consists just of this thought itself. On this basis, while it is not clear how music is an 
experiencing subject, conceiving it as capable of propositional thought then 
facilitates modes for it such as having a personality and using its personhood to 
author attitudes and thoughts. In this way, music would be able to seem in control of 
its own actions (control consciousness), to generate propositional thought (A-
consciousness), to possess and use a self-concept (self-consciousness), and to perceive 
internally its own consciousness (monitoring consciousness). The agency of music 
would therefore arise because it is acting in all these different, self-regulatory ways, 
even though it may not be a subject and have experience in the standard sense. For 
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example, the sense of momentum and structure we may feel from a large-scale 
musical work would be attributed to the sense that the music is in control of its own 
actions, which is characteristic of control consciousness.5    
 This paper explains the agency and animacy of music using an (as it were) 
threshold form of consciousness, A-consciousness, that can cooperate with P-
consciousness. To argue that music is P-conscious as such may be near impossible 
according to the restrictions that, as Nagel (1974) says, impose themselves on our 
conceptualizations of consciousness. But (as Nagel also says), there are experiential 
facts beyond our conception that are yet accessible to us. In achieving this 
accessibility, hypothesizing a conceptual model of music as being A-conscious (the 
concept of reflexivization) could allow an explanation of the activities and functions 
music anthropomorphically performs as animate agent. Propositional attitudes are 
taken as an agential characteristic. We address the problem of music’s not being an 
identifiable subject by theorizing for it a form of consciousness, A-consciousness, by 
which it can aspire to functions which, when performed, would result in experience. 
In a further step, thinking like this could allow us to conceive the possibility that 
music is an experiencing subject on a par with subjects at the top end of the 
cognitive-experiencing scale. 
 We describe what it is like to be music in terms of what it is like to be 
ourselves (that is, agential descriptions of music rely on biological parameters – for 
example, music goes up and down, swells and recedes). This paper explores how 
there is plausible reasoning to suggest that we can theorize what it would be like for 
music to be itself, by postulating attitudinal representational content and activity for 
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it, as occurring in A-consciousness. As noted, for Block (1995) A-consciousness 
interacts with P-consciousness. In this regard it would be of benefit to define further 
the nature of the interaction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness and 
apply relevant analogies to an understanding of music as A-conscious, and of other 
hypothetical consciousnesses like machines (cf. Lewis & MacGregor, 2009). This 
would enable conceptualization of how, if music were conscious, its “higher” 
functions could include attributes such as sentience.  
 This paper does not discuss (1) how, if music hypothetically were conscious, 
its consciousness could apply in different kinds or genres of music, (2) how our 
perception of music would change if it were conscious, (3) the implications for the 
philosophy of mind of thinking music as conscious, (4) complete answers to the 
concerns of metaphorists who believe that musical motion is inevitably the product 
of metaphorical cognition, and (5) how, in detail, if music were conscious, this could 
be evidenced empirically. Nonetheless, the aim and hope is that this paper will foster 
further thinking about the nature of music that is complementary to that currently 
being undertaken to expand our ways of thinking about consciousness. In many 
ways we can describe music so as to attribute pseudo-consciousness to it. The 
thoughts of Nagel (1974) and certain ways in which we might think about music, 
such as those outlined here, suggest that the leap to attributing genuine 
consciousness to music may not be as fanciful as we might think. The challenge is to 
clarify the nature of that leap. 
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1 A review of extant general criticisms of CMT is beyond the scope of this paper. 
CMT and embodied cognition (EC) (and its subarea embodied music cognition 
[EMC]) are interrelated programs. Queries about these programs have been raised in 
Murphy (1996, 1997), McGlone (2007), Dove (2011), Casasanto and Gijssels (2015), 
Mahon (2015), and Goldinger, Papesh, Barnhart, Hansen and Hout (2016). 
2 For contemporary support of Davidson’s position see Davies (1984) and 
Crosthwaite (1985). 
3 What Block (1995) most likely means by “sensation” is the mental state arising when 
any of the senses are stimulated or from the condition of a part of the body. 
“Feeling”, it appears, refers to the action of experiencing a sensation occasioned by a 
stimulus. 
4 Byrne (1997, p. 105) notes: “there is nothing in general that it is like to have a 
conscious thought – that is, conscious thoughts need not be phenomenal – so some 
other sense of consciousness is required. And perhaps access consciousness fits the 
bill” (my italics). In the account that follows, the overall hypothesis is that access 
consciousness, despite its not generally being associated with what-it-is-like-ness 
(phenomenality), could provide insight into what it would be like for music (which 
is conventionally deemed not to have experience) to be itself, if it were conscious. 
5 In a recent review article, Hubbard (2017, p. 25) concludes that music may have a 
unique, specific “momentum-like effect” which derives from musical motion. 
Hubbard explains momentum-like effects as kinds of experience in which general 
senses of momentum, which occur in phenomena, are somehow perceptually 
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extended in terms of their qualitative or quantitative aspects. For example, 
representational momentum is a momentum-like effect referring to the tendency to 
remember a moving target as having travelled further along its direction of travel 
than it actually did. In terms of the present discussion, some of the details of a 
specifically musical momentum as a new momentum-like effect might be utilized in 
conceiving musical momentum as actual and a component of music’s conscious 
sense of control over itself. In similarity to arguments outlined in Part 1 of this paper, 
this would involve reappraising metaphorical thinking as applied to the case of 
musical motion. 
